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Book Review
Robert Katzmann, Judging Statutes, New York: Oxford University Press,
pp. 184, $26.95 (cloth)

2oi4,

Reviewed by Peter Strauss
Chief Judge Robert Katzmann has written a compelling short book about
statutory interpretation. It could set the framework for a two- or three-hour
legislation class, supplemented by cases and other readings of the instructor's
choosing. Or it might more simply be used as an independent reading
assignment as law school begins, to apprise 2ist-century law students just how
important the interpretation of statutes will prove to be in the profession they
are entering, and how unsettled are the judiciary's means of dealing with them.
It should be required reading for all who teach in the field.
After establishing the importance of the skill-do our students appreciate
that understanding statutes (and other governing texts) concerns the courts far
more often than working out the common law?-Judge Katzmann makes clear
his preference to be Congress's faithful agent. He much more often invokes
"Congress's meaning in the statutes it enacts" (3)than the fictional "intent,"
'intention," or "intended meaning" one so frequently finds in discussions
of interpretation. He knows, as we do, that a body of 535 very different and
variably attentive individuals cannot "intend" as that word is best understood.
But the words Congress enacts must have meaning if they are to be law. "Our
constitutional system charges Congress, the people's branch of representatives,
with enacting laws. So, how Congress makes its purposes known, through text
and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be
respected, lest the integrity of legislation be undermined" (4).
I
An introductory chapter mapping the book makes clear that Judge
Katzmann understands the continuing tensions between textualists and
purposivists, and that he places himself in the purposivist camp. Does
the meaning a judge will ascribe to the words of the text as she chooses to
understand them dominate, even in cases in which more than one reading
is possible? Or is it appropriate to discern Congress's meaning-that is, the
legislation's meaning-by drawing on other indicators, such as legislative
Peter Strauss is the Betts Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.
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materials? For him, the answer begins with institutional understanding, with
"an appreciation of how Congress actually functions, how Congress signals
its
meaning, and what Congress expects of those interpreting its laws .... [F]or
the judiciary, understanding that process is essential if it is to construe statutes
in a manner faithful to legislative meaning" (8-9). And, later discussion will
reveal, no federal appellate judge today has had personal experience as a
legislator; only a small handful (significantly including Judge Katzmann)
have had significant experience working as legislative staff or as academics
directly engaged with the legislative enterprise. The obstacles are considerable,
then, to the institutional understanding that is so essential to the productive
partnership he seeks.
II
In consequence, the book's first substantive task is to explore "Congress
and the Lawmaking Process," and to do so in a manner that lays bare
its institutional characteristics and their implications. Our students are
constantly engaged with the characteristics of judges, their courts, and the
judicial system. Should they not be invited as well to explore the institutional
characteristics of legislators and legislatures, "the engine of statutes" (12)? If
I were to single out twelve pages of this book that every law student should
read, it would be the pages of Chapter 2, for their detail and realism about the
Congress, their capacity to help students grasp the complexity of legislative
processes, the significant time constraints and competing demands within
which legislators must act, and the elements of institutional functioning that
influence the reliability of some of the signals one can find in the history of
successful legislation.
The last of these is the most important. Judge Katzmann draws on the
remarkable contributions of Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter,' and then
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman,2 in describing the realities of the congressional
drafting process. Students need to understand how little in this process
corresponds to the imaginings of textualist judges. Committees differ in their
drafting practices; virtually all drafting is in the hands not of Members, but
of committee staff apprised of Members' policy preferences and professional
drafting offices responsible for technical issues; even committee Members, and
certainly other Members of Congress, rely much more heavily on committee
reports that describe a bill's policy choices-reports whose honesty about what
the bill seeks to achieve is enforced by reputational concerns inherent in the
continuing nature of the enterprise-than on often incommunicative text.
Judge Katzmann underscores this point by quoting elements of the Hobby
Lobby legislation that simply recite amendments to existing law; only the report
1.

Victoria E Nourse & Jane S. Shacter, 7he Politics oflegislative Drfting:A CongressionalCase Study,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).

2.

Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutoy Interpretation From the Inside-An Empirical
Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation and the Canons, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (Part I) and
66 STAN. L. REv. 725 (2014) (Part II).
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could help a member with limited time understand what was being proposed.
Gluck and Bressman, as he mentions, reveal other considerations: Drafters
are unaware of canons and maxims, particularly most of the clear statement
rules the Court has recently articulated; they do not use dictionaries; they
do not often seek usage consistency with pre-existing elements of statutes;
Members vote on the basis of what they read in committee reports, and
especially conference committee reports, and so regard them as essential to
understanding their work.
The Supreme Court oral argument in one of the cases Judge Katzmann
discusses in the fifth chapter of his book, Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy,3 rather dramatically illustrates a lawyer's and two Justices'
indifference to, indeed ignorance of, Congress's institutional practices and
their practical implications for Members' understanding of the meaning
of their action. The question in the case was whether a statutory phrase
authorizing courts to award "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs
to the parents or guardian of a youth who is the prevailing party" in seeking
proper special education treatment included the costs of the experts the
parents or guardians would almost necessarily hire to make their case for
that treatment. The legislative history of the statute of which these words
were a part reveals significant controversy about many issues, but a uniform,
uncontroversial, and repeatedly stated understanding that those costs were
to be included. The word "costs," it appeared, was consistently understood
in its ordinary meaning, "expenses," and not as a reference to court costs in
the term of art sense. The House and Senate enacted bills that differed in a
number of respects, including in a minor way the wording of this provision,
and so they went to conference. The resulting conference report resolving all
controversies, submitted to both chambers and accepted by both, reiterated
the understanding that had been put before both chambers in committee
reports and debate, and enacted in the bills each voted4: "The conferees intend
3.

548 U.S. 29 1(2oo6). Having assisted with and signed the Murphys' brief, BriefofRespondents,
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2oo6) (No. o5-18), http://
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=Io 3 4&context=scb,
I was present at the argument and heard these questions asked and statements made by
Justices in apparent sincerity. All maybe found in the transcript of argument, Oral Argument,
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2oo6) (No. o5-18), http://
www.oyez.org/cases/2ooo-2009/2oo/2oo5o518 [hereinafter Murphy Oral Argument].
My teaching materials on legislation and statutory interpretation -PETER L. STRAUSS, LEGAL
METHODS: UNDERSTANDING AND USING CASES AND STATUTES ( 3d ed. 2014) -commit about
five hours of class in the final weeks to the historical progression of recent decisions and
statutes concerning the reimbursement of attorneys' fees and expert witness fees. For the last
of these sessions, for which they will have read Murphy after reading and discussing preceding
judicial and statutory developments, and about 50 pages from the legislative history of the
statute, I simply play the recording of this argument.

4.

The House version, as enacted, provided for the award of "reasonable attorneys' fees,
expenses, and costs." H.R. 1523 § 615(e)( 4)(B), 9 9 th Cong. (1986) (enacted). The Senate
version, as initially voted in committee contained an elaborate provision that included
"reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable witness fees, and other reasonable expenses." S. 415
§ 615(f,

99

th Cong. (1985), in S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 6 (1985). A streamlined substitute bill
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that the term 'attorneys' fees as part of the costs' include reasonable expenses
and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation
which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the... case."5 Under the
rules of both House and Senate, conferees are obliged to report compromises
(which this was not) and precluded from changing matters not in controversy
(as, again, this matter was not). And, under those rules, the vote on receiving
a conference report is not a vote only on the agreed text it reports; it is a vote
to accept the report. Here, then, are the excerpts from the oral arguments in
the case:
Mr. [Raymond] Kuntz (for the School Board): [The Conference Report
language about reimbursement of expert witnesses] emanates solely from the
House conference report.
Justice Scalia: Well, that's only half of the Congress, isn't it? ... So we have
a committee of one house.., that thought it meant that or would have liked
it to mean that.
Mr. Kuntz: Yes, Your Honor...
Justice Stevens: How do you explain the title, Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of the Conference? Doesn't that speak for both the House
and the Senate?
Mr. Kuntz: It... yes, Your Honor, it does.
ChiefJustice Roberts: Counsel, sometimes these joint statements are actually
voted on by the Congress as a whole. Was this one voted on?
Mr. Kuntz: There was no evidence of that, Your Honor, in our review....
Justice Scalia: They are voted on... when the conferees make changes, which
they sometimes do. Then... of course, they have to be voted on. So it's ... frequent
that they're voted on, but this one apparently ... there were no changes made
and it wasn't voted on .... [sic]
Mr. [David] Vladeck (for the Murphys): ... So I think that at least in the
conference report, Congress is signaling that if there were other costs that
were incurred unreasonably as a result of lawyers protracting or delaying a
proceeding, they too would be subject to the same reduction.
that was the matter voted into conference by the Senate spoke generally of "a reasonable
attorney's fee in addition to the costs to a parent..." but also included a subsection strongly
opposed by the Democratic members of the committee and, as they wished, rejected in
conference, that would have limited attorneys' fees paid to publicly funded organizations,
provided that for them the "reasonable attorney's fee" should be computed on the basis
of "actual cost," computed "including the proportion of the compensation of the attorney
so related, other reasonable expenses that can be documented, and the proportion of the
annual overhead costs ... attributable to the number of hours reasonably spent on such civil
action." S. 415 § 615(C)(ii), 99 th Cong. (1986).

5-

H.R. CONE. REP. No. 99-687 (1986).
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Justice Scalia: And that's effective too, as though it were written into the
statute, because one committee of Congress said so ....
Mr. Vladeck: Well, Your Honor, this is not one committee of Congress. This
was ... the conference report [that] was circulated to all Members of Congress
before they voted on the final bill.
Justice Scalia: And... and they read it.
Mr. Vladeck: Well, Your Honor, this is the final bill they voted on, and if they
turned the pageJustice Scalia: That's the only thing we know for sure that they voted on.
Mr. Vladeck: ... The vote was a vote to approve the conference report, which
6

contains... three pages of text and three pages of explanation.

If, thenjudges imagine themselves as Congress's faithful agents, empowered to
act only within the framework legislation establishes, it is hard when ascribing
meaning to legislative text (and Judge Katzmann earnestly wishes us to realize
it is hard) to discard as misleading or at best useless the materials on which the
Congress depends when acting. These materials signal its Members' probable
understanding of those words, and hence their probable understanding
of the meaning their votes have enacted. Declaring independence of these
signals repudiates the faithful servant ideal-no faithful servant would insist
upon ascribing his own meaning to his mistress's words in the face of clear
indications of how she understood them.
Focusing as he does on the Congress-court relationship, however, Judge
Katzmann omits attention to a different possibility- that the courts serve,
in effect, as the agents of the public that reads statutes, not as agents of the
legislature that enacts them. Could treating a statute as a reader's text, not a
writer's text-a perspective he does not directly consider-lead one to a world
in which ordinary meanings should prevail, whatever Members might have
understood the words they were enacting to mean? That is a possibility those
interested in these questions will want to consider.
Yet taking this road need not bring your students to the Supreme Court's
textualists' door. The "public's agent"judge would seem to have a responsibility
to consult the public's probable understanding, not her own, and often that is
not the pattern one finds. Although the public's understanding may extend to
common linguistic usage canons and a few of the maxims-that a penal statute
must give fair warning of its application, for example-it hardly reaches "whole
act" canons, and certainly not the "whole code" canons and clear statement
maxims courts have elaborated for reasons of their own. The affected publicparticularly those well-advised by lawyers-may well know the political history
of a statute as well as, if not better than, they know its precise text, and may
indeed have sought their own understanding of the law (as nonmembers of
6.

Murphy Oral Argument, supra note 3.
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legislative committees do) by consulting the committee reports now available
online.
Treating statutes from the public reader's perspective also suggests
understanding them as of the time they are read, not as of the time they are
written-another perspective Judge Katzmann does not explicitly explore. For
a statute that has aged, the public reader may be moved by the contemporary
meanings of statutory words, not the usages that may have prevailed at the
time of enactment. Its readings will occur in the framework of understandings
created by law and other factors in the current day-what the statute has come
to mean in intervening years as courts and administrators have encountered
and applied it. When a statute passed in 1934 has uniformly been taken to have
a particular meaning-one readily associated with common legal approaches-a
textualist's exploration how its words would have been understood back then
cannot be associated with a "public's agent" approach. The public confronts
the law as it is and has become today. The textualist move, in such cases, creates
unwelcome surprises unseating contemporary understandings of the law, not
a vindication of what the contemporary reader would properly understand it
to be.7
III
In addressing the relation between Congress and the agencies on which
it often relies for the implementation of its work, the third chapter of Jadging
Statutes treats a consideration that comes close to the "public reader" perspective.
Agencies are bodies that have a profound incentive to act as faithful agents
and have, as well, continuous and intense relationships that permit them much
more intimate knowledge of the legislative process as it affects their interests.
They are often the drafters of legislative proposals; on any matter affecting
their particular responsibilities, they are directly engaged with the responsible
committees throughout their processes, staying aware of any changes that may
occur. Their incentive is not only intimately to know and closely to follow
the legislative process, but also thoroughly to understand the expectations
that that process engenders. Because future appropriations, future success
in securing desired changes, and the temper of future oversight hearings all
may depend on Congress's perception of their faithfulness as agents, they
have a continuous incentive universally to honor those expectations when
implementing a statute after its passage. To be sure, agencies are themselves
public bodies, so that their statutory interpretation might seem an imitation of
judicial interpretation. Yet in relation to the courts they are public readers. As
readers, Judge Katzmann reasons, their understanding properly departs from
the textualist model. And the Chevron doctrine, as he remarks, demarcates areas
7.

Consider in this respect Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v.FirstInterstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994), in which the Court, 5-4, addressing a question not presented in the petition
for certiorari, disagreed on the basis of its understanding of original textual meaning with

eleven circuits and the SEC on the question whether "aiding and abetting" could be the
basis for private enforcement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Peter L. Strauss,
On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Law, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 429.
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of responsibility within which those readings will prevail. "It is ... striking
that agencies . . . view legislative history as essential reading, but within the
judiciary there has been considerable debate as to whether legislative history
should be used at all" (28).
Of course, to the extent agencies can anticipate that judicial review of
a decision's interpretation will be driven by simple and perhaps timeless
textualism, they will have some incentive to read the statutes for which they
are responsible in that way Yet judicial review is episodic and delayed well
past the point of agency decision. It occurs in only a tiny fraction of the
occasions when agencies will have to decide the meaning of the statutes they
are responsible to administer. Congress, on the other hand, is a constant and
immediate presence in their consciousness. And, again, an agency's knowledge
of legislative materials will not be acquired just for the infrequent occasions
when their interpretations might be judicially reviewed; it pervades the whole
of their actions.

IV
It is only after introducing us to Congress and to agencies, encouraging the
reader to appreciate their functioning and the elements in it that contribute
to their understanding of legislative meaning, that Judge Katzmann turns in
Chapter 4 to "Judicial Interpretation of Statutes." The structure of the book
is in itself an argument for his preferred approach to judging statutes, as the
chapter's opening paragraph acknowledges:
Given my arguments that courts should respect Congress's work product,
it will not surprise you that I find authoritative legislative history useful when
I interpret statutes. I start with the premise that the role of the courts is to
interpret the law in a way that is faithful to its meaning. The role of the court
is not to substitute its judgment or to alter the terms of the statute. Judicial
respect for Congress and its lawmaking prerogatives in our constitutional
scheme requires no less. For a court, that means using the interpretive
materials the legislative branch thinks important to understanding its work.
Doing so promotes good government as courts applying such methods are
more likely to reach results consistent with legislative meaning. Doing so also
facilitates healthy interbranch relations as legislators view courts as seeking to
hew to the statute's meaning as passed by Congress (29).
It is hardly that text is irrelevant; Judge Katzmann acknowledges its
constraints. But in assessing whether a statute's words can have only a single
meaning that must then control, assessing purpose can be either reassuring or
evidence of the alternative means of understanding that are so often present.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court in the previous Term can be used to
illustrate the power of such inquiries.

JournalofLegal Education

A.
In Yates v. United States, decided just before the oral argument in the second
of these cases, King v. Burwell,9 the question was the meaning to be ascribed
to the words "tangible object" that appear in Section 8o2 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, a 66-page law enacted following the collapse of Enron
Corporation. Major accounting scandals involving document alteration and
destruction had come to light in the wake of Enron's collapse. The immediate
legislative history of that Act reflects Members' awareness of these recent
events and wish to prevent their recurrence, protect investors, and restore
trust in financial markets. Section 8o2, titled "Criminal penalties for altering
documents," contained two provisions that were made part of the criminal
code." One was 18 U.S.C. §i52o, "Destruction of corporate audit records.",,
The second, at issue in Yates, was 18 U.S.C. § ii9, "Destruction, alteration, or
falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy":
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies,
or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent
to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States or any case filed under title it, or in relation to or contemplation of any
such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
2o years, or both.There were indications that the phrase "record, document, or tangible
object" had been imported from a provision of the American Law Institute's
i962 Model Penal Code [MPC], which defined as a misdemeanor the act of
anyone who, "believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending
or about to be instituted, alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, or removes
a record, document or thing."13 Comments to the provision said that this
proscription should be understood to refer to all physical evidence4
Yates was captain of a commercial fishing boat; a federal agent, while
conducting an offshore inspection of his boat at sea, had found that the ship's
catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of federal conservation
regulations5 The officer instructed Yates to keep the undersized fish
segregated from the rest of the catch until his ship returned to port. 6 After the
8.

135 S. Ct. 1075 (2o15).

9.

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2o15).

1o.

Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1o85.

it.

Id. at io8i.

12.

IS

13.

MODEL PENAL CODE

14.

Id., at cmt. 3.

9
U.S.C. § 151
(2012) (emphasis added).

§ 241.7(1) (AM.

15. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1076, 1078.
16.

Id. at 1078.

LAW INST.,

Proposed Official

Draft 1962).

Book Review: Judging Statutes

officer departed, Yates instead told a crew member to throw the undersized
fish overboard7 For this offense, he was convicted of a violation of §I519, for
destroying, concealing, and covering up tangible objects-to wit, undersized
fish-to impede a federal investigation."
Clearly, in ordinary meaning, a fish is a "tangible object." Justice Ginsberg,
writing for herself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor,
invoked the context of the legislation to limit their reach to "objects one can
use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the physical world."'
Its title, its placement, discussions in the legislative history, canons counseling
using the meaning of a series in which interpreted words appear as an indicator
of their proper scope, and the principle of lenity as well-all these suggested a
necessary limitation on the meaning "tangible object" should be understood
to have, and none pointed at fish. Justice Alito concurred (providing the
necessary fifth vote for the result), relying on the textual indicators alone.
Justice Kagan wrote a strong dissent for herself and Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas arguing that "conventional tools of statutory construction all lead
to a more conventional result: A 'tangible object' is an object that's tangible."2'
Noting how frequently Congress and state legislatures had used the terms, and
always with embracive breadth in view, she finds a broad reading reinforced
by legislative history that, viewed from a different angle, "for those who care
about it, puts extra icing on a cake already frosted."2' Aware that existing
laws penalized those who assisted others by destroying evidence, but not
those who did it for themselves-as Captain Yates had done-Congress meant
embracively to close a loophole in the law punishing obstruction ofjustice. As
Justice Kagan put it:
I agree with the plurality (really, who does not?) that context matters in
interpreting statutes. We do not "construe the meaning of statutory terms in a
vacuum. Tjler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2ooi). Rather, we interpret particular
words "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme." Davis v.Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 8o3, 8o9 (1989). And
sometimes that means, as the plurality says, that the dictionary definition of
a disputed term cannot control. See, e.g., Bloate v.United States, 559 U.S. 196, n.9
(2oio). But this is not such an occasion, for here the text and its context point
the same way. Stepping back from the words "tangible object" provides only
further evidence that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.22

17.

Id.

18.

I.

19.

Id.

2o.

Yates, 135 S. Ct. at

21.

Id. at 1093.

22.

Id. at

1092.

1o91 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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B.
Justices Kagan and Kennedy joined the Justices of the Yates plurality, and
Justice Alito joined Justices Scalia and Thomas in dissent, in King v. Burwell,
a case in which a few perhaps inadvertent words in a statute of enormous
length, complexity, and economic significance appeared to threaten the
viability of its program. The statute was the highly controversial Affordable
Care Act.23 If generally healthy members of the public elect not to buy health
insurance because of its cost, the resulting adverse selection bias (i.e., only
persons thinking they will have an immediate need will then purchase it)
produces rapidly escalating costs for the insurance, further discouraging the
healthy from participation. To combat this effect, the Act sought to require
purchase of insurance by all who could afford it-and to make purchases
more affordable for lower-income people by establishing a tax credit scheme
that would reduce their net cost to the relatively small proportion of their
annual income that measured their purchase obligation. To create competitive
markets for insurance, the Act invited states to create exchanges of a defined
character on which health insurance purchases would be made; and it
provided that if any state chose not to create an exchange, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services would create a federal exchange within that state
for its citizens. The provisions for tax credits state that receiving them depends
on enrollment in an insurance plan "through an Exchange established by the
State," and the issue was whether those who enrolled in an insurance plan
through afederal exchange, in one of the 34 states that had not established a
state exchange, could receive the tax credit. If they could not receive it, a much
higher proportion of that state's population would be freed of any obligation
to purchase health insurance, because it would be deemed unaffordable in
relation to their income under the statute. Then the operation of adverse
selection on their choice to insure or not would prompt a "death spiral" of yet
higher rates and consequent higher exclusions from the purchase obligation,
defeating any hope for "affordable care" and expanded insurance coverage of
the population.
Reports of the oral argument had Justice Kagan focused much more clearly
on context and consequences than she might have appeared to be in Yates,
issued just days earlier. "We don't look at four words," Justice Kagan said.24
"We look at the whole text, the particular context, the more general context,
try to make everything harmonious with everything else."25 Justice Kennedy's
expressed concern was whether Congress credibly-even permissiblycould have put states to the choice between creating a state exchange and
having health insurance rates for their citizens driven sky-high by the "death
23.

42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2o12).

24.

Oral Argument Transcript at 37, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2o15) (No. 14-114), http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcriptS /14-n14-lkhn.pdf.

25.

Adam Liptak, At Least One _ustice Is in Play as Supreme CourtHears Health Case, N.Y. TIMES, March
5, 2015, at Ai.
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spiral" that could result from denial of the tax credits.26 The opinion for
the Court, written by the Chief Justice, was driven by a sense of the overall
incompatibility of "Exchange established by the State" with the purposes of
the statutory scheme and the possibility of their accomplishment; just a few
words, lost in the statute's complexity and likely not noticed for their possible
impact in defeating what appeared to be a clear and coherent design, would be
interpreted as if they embraced federal exchanges as well. For the dissenters,
much more stridently than in Yates, this was judicial legislation; essentially
lacking the capacity to ascribe coherence or purpose to what the words of
the statute ostensibly said, they rested on Congress's responsibility, not the
Court's, to enact laws.
C.
One readily imagines Judge Katzmann's satisfaction with both outcomes,
since both privilege discernible purpose over "ordinary meaning" textualism.
This chapter presents a clear statement of "the purposive approach" as "[t]he
dominant mode of statutory interpretation over the past century," (31) and
the positive uses of legislative history in its service, before turning to "the
textualist critique," a discussion of their impact, and finally his own "critique
of textualism."
Judge Katzmann chooses as the "classic exemplar" of the purposive approach
the decision in Church of the Hoy Trinity v. United States.27 Perhaps in choosing
the favorite whipping boy of textualists he is intending to be provocative,
as Justice Stevens once was with an unnecessary footnote reference that sent
Justice Scalia into dissenting orbit.2' For me, Holy T inity is a poor as well as a
provocative choice. Its decision did not require departure from the statutory
text, as its caricatures regularly assert-just one reading of the statute as a whole
rather than another; and its diction makes clear that the Justices' personal
normativities ("a Christian nation") were important factors in the decision. As
Judge Katzmann remarks in the following text, purposivism has sturdy roots
in the work of judges, such as Learned Hand, and scholars (Hart & Sacks)
who remain admired today; Justice Brewer, the author of Holy Trinity, does not.
One can without difficulty find purposive decisions apparently untinged by
judges' strong personal preferences,9 using a persuasive assessment of purpose
to support one possible, but perhaps less obvious, reading of statutory text.
The alternative, as he remarks, is that "judges will interpret statutes unmoored
from the reality of the legislative process and what legislators were seeking to

do" (35).
26.

Id.

27.

143 U.S. 457 (1892).

28.

See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007), at 107 n.3 (Stevens, J.
concurring), io8, ni6 if. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

29.

E.g., Johnson v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 196 U.S. i(19o4); SEC .v Collier, 76 E2d 949 (2d
Cir. 1935); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 US 534 (1940); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. in (1944).
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Hart & Sacks chose as their illustration of this peril of simple textualism
and strength of purposivism two decisions reached not long after Hoy
Trinity-Judge Sanborn's decision for the Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Southern
Pacfc R. Co.,3o followed by its reversal in the Supreme Court.3' At issue was
the meaning of a statute requiring railroads to equip their interstate "cars"
with automatic couplers, a requirement driven by the extraordinary level of
injuries railroad brakemen were suffering in manually coupling cars that either
were unequipped for automatic couplers or had couplers incompatible with
one another. The statute precluded a railroad from using the "assumption
of the risk" defense then common in workplace injury litigation to defend a
brakeman's (or his widow's) suit to recover for an injury suffered in attempting
a manual coupling between two "cars" that were not equipped. Johnson lost
his hand while attempting manually to couple a dining car equipped with
one kind of coupler with a freight engine equipped with an incompatible
kind of coupler.32 For Judge Sanborn, it was obvious that an engine was not
a "car," and in any event that both engine and dining car were equipped with
automatic couplers. A strong driver of his opinion appeared to be the statute's
abrogation of the "assumption of the risk" defense, and "statutes in derogation
of the common law must be narrowly construed." His opinion evidences no
concern for statutory purpose, and much concern that a central pillar of
judge-made common law might be undermined. For the Supreme Court, an
understanding of the statute's purpose to protect brakemen from injury drove
the linguistically less obvious conclusions that an engine should be treated
as a "car" in relation to the obligation to have automatic couplers, and that
compatibility in use, not mere equipment, was required.
Johnson was one of the earlier Supreme Court cases to refer to legislative
history (as Hoy Trinily had also done), and the association between purposive
interpretation and use of legislative history is, if not inevitably required, a
strong one. In addressing the uses of legislative history, Judge Katzmann
refocuses on its institutional importance to Congress-reflected both in
the ways Members speak about it and in the Bressman-Gluck finding that
it "was emphatically viewed by almost all of our respondents- Republicans
and Democrats, majority and minority, alike-as the most important drafting
and interpretive tool apart from text" (37)'33 As Judge Sanborn's opinion in
Johnson could be seen to illustrate, "[dlepriving judges of what appeared to
animate legislators risks having courts interpret the legislation in ways that the
legislators did not intend, replacing reasoned analysis of what Congress was
trying to do with subjective preferences" (38).
30.

117E 462 (19o2).

31.

196 U.S. i (i9o4).

32.

This equipment choice appears to have been common, reflecting a trade-off between
sturdiness (freight) and comfort (passenger); couplings between freight and passenger
equipment were not frequent.

33.

Quoting Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schulz Bressman, Statutoy Interpretation,PartI, at 965, supra
note 2.
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The problem, as Adrian Vermeule noted in one 34 of the many sources Judge
Katzmann cites, and lists in his extraordinarily rich and helpful appendicesreason in themselves for acquiring this book-is that Members' awareness that
courts had begun to rely on legislative history catalyzed the manipulative
abuses that so arm the textualist arguments. One observable phenomenon
of the years after the "switch in time that saved nine" during the New Deal
was that the judicial use of legislative history became extremely detailed, even
on occasion taking precedence over attention to text. 35 Perhaps this was an
unconscious signal by the courts that they had learned their lesson-that they
and the common law were now secondary to Congress's statutory choices-but
whatever the occasion for it, the result was an explosion of "the committee
intends," of colloquies self-evidently structured for judicial, not collegial
attention, and of other efforts to influence not present votes but subsequent
interpretation-and all on propositions that were not directly put to a vote.
Judge Katzmann is certainly aware of the problems thus created for finding
reliable indicators in legislative history of the meanings legislators associated
with the words they enacted. He quotes with approval Chief Justice Roberts's
observation at his confirmation hearing that only those elements of it Members
themselves institutionally rely upon are worthy of consideration. Granted the
risks that Members will abuse these signals, risks of which judges must be
aware, nonetheless resolutely ignoring them carries its own risks of "having
courts interpret the legislation in ways that the legislators did not intend,
replacing reasoned analysis of what Congress was trying to do with subjective
preferences. "36
The argument would have been strengthened, in myjudgment, by attention
to two considerations he does not directly address. One, already mentioned, is
that the primary interest in determining the meaning ofa statute's text lies with
the affected public-the readers of statutes, agencies and citizens-and not with
the courts. Even if courts should regard themselves as the public's "faithful
servant," not Congress's, a useful question to ask about the persuasiveness of a
statute's legislative-or more broadly, political-history would be how well it is
likely to be known to the affected public, either directly or, as the statute ages
in application, indirectly through the law's consistent, observable applications.
One imagines that considerations like these moved the majorities in the recent
decisions in Burwell and Yates. Second, and more important in my judgment, is
that for Judge Katzmann and his court, statutory interpretation is most often
routine, not a high-stakes political matter-that is, it usually occurs in settings
in which the likelihood is higher that Members are informing each other about
34. Adrian Vermeule, 7he Cycles of Statutoy Interpretation, 68 U.

CHi. L. REv. 149 (2ool). Judge
Katzmann does not, however, cite the work for the point made here in the text.

35. Judge Katzmann quotes, at 45,Judge Marshall's remark in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 Y.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971) that because "[t]he legislative history ... is ambiguous ...
we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent."

36.

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd.of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
dissenting).

291, 324 (2oo6) (Breyer, J.,
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understood meaning, and not attempting to sway the courts on propositions
for which they cannot garner votes. This was the point Justice Breyer made
while still a First Circuit judge, in an article37 that remains my favorite in the
law review literature on interpretation for its practical demonstration of the
utility of careful use of legislative materials in the routine cases court of appeals
judges cannot escape deciding. The Supreme Court chooses its docket, and if
it is choosing well it is choosing cases in which issues are nearly in equipoise,
and political stakes can be high.3 Adventitious distortions of the legislative
process 39 are perhaps more to be feared in that setting than in the run of cases
court of appeals judges must decide. Judge Katzmann does not develop the
ways in which his situation might differ from that Supreme Court Justices
encounter-as, indeed, attention to the impact that a court's choosing of its
docket has on the rationale for the judicial lawmaking inherent in stare decisis4o
is missing from the literature generally
V
Judging Statutes' fifth chapter, "Some Cases I Have Decided," may be
the most revealing to students and the most suitable for direct classroom
37.

Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative Histoty in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845
(1992). Justice Breyer, unlike his colleagues, has had direct personal experience with the
legislative process, having once served as Chief Counsel to the SenateJudiciary Committee.

38.

See Harry Edwards, The JudicialFunction andthe Elusive Goal of PrincipledDecisionmaking,1991 Wisc.
L. REv. 837, 855-57 (1991).

39.

Distortions that can affect statutory text as well as legislative history, when the context
is a long, complex statute addressing a contentious subject. Did the unexplained words
"through an Exchange established by the State" in the 270o-page Affordable Care Act,
central to the decision in Burwell, enter the statute through careless drafting, or surreptitious
mischief? Given their "ordinary meaning," which would exclude the federal exchanges
created in states that had not themselves established an exchange, these words would be
impossible to square with the understood ends of the statute. Their destructive impact on
the statutory plan, if understood in an "ordinary meaning" way, sufficed to persuade the
majority to bend them to serve the plan's unambiguous purpose.

40.

The classic support for the discipline of common law precedent and stare decisis is that it
derives from the necessity of decision of a controversy parties have put before a court, in
the absence of established governing principles. Any new principle of the common law that
may emerge from the decision is a byproduct of the necessity to decide, and only principles
that were necessaty to that decision (holding, not dicta) are entitled to stare decisiseffect. Courts'
caution about advisory opinions and litigation lacking real controversy (possibly contrived
to produce new law) reflects this insistence on the necessity of deciding a real controversy
put before the court by parties with opposing stakes in its outcome, in relation to which
new law is merely a byproduct. But a court choosing 8o or fewer cases each year from a
possible docket of thousands is not in such a position; indeed, it is supposed to select those
cases for which the settlement of open legal questions is the most important to the public,
not those in which the particular parties seeking review have the highest stakes. The New
York Court of Appeals, which has a capacity to choose the cases it will decide comparable to
the Supreme Court's, opened one opinion with these words: "We granted leave to appeal in
order to take another step toward a complete solution of the problem partially cleared up in
[two of its recent decisions]." Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432 (1963).
That candid admission is in considerable tension with the premises of stare decisis.
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discussion. It discusses three controversies in which an opinion of his 41 was
one element of a disagreement among the circuits that the Supreme Court
then resolved-twice agreeing with his opinion,42 and once with the contrary
view (but principally on grounds considered in neither circuit's opinions).43
The controversies, attorneys' arguments, and the reasoning of all the opinions
in the cases, majority and dissent, are fully and fairly described, with brief
commentary about their fit with the issues he has developed earlier in the
book. The chapter ends with a Coda disclaiming the possibility of
a grand theory of statutory interpretation .... Statutes differ, contexts differ,
and how tools are used may vary from case to case. But the essential framework
that guides me remains the same: at all times, I seek to interpret the statute in
ways that realize Congress's meanings and purposes to the best I can discern
them. It is for me a practical inquiry, grounded in a process that is respectful
of the legislature and its workways. And, in that examination, sticking only to
the text may stand in the way of correctly construing legislative meaning. It is
for you to judge whether I got it right (9i).
Were I using the book as a teaching vehicle, as is tempting, I'd make this
chapter central, spending at least a day on each of the cases. Our students
get too little in the way of primary materials other than judicial decisionsand in connection with the decisions they get only the (edited) opinions, not
the briefs to see how lawyers argued the cases. Although Judge Katzmann's
descriptions reveal a lot, I'd be moved to try to work up a full set of materialsfull statutory text, edited legislative history at some length, any preceding
caselaw development, and enough of the briefs for students to see the
issues as they were put to the courts. As noted above, 44 in my own teaching
materials I have done this for the controversies and statutory developments
that eventuated in Murphy (and now, this year's closely divided attorneys' fee
decision in Baker Botts L.L.P v. ASARCO LLC).45 It is invaluable for students to
experience statutory issues as attorneys do-independent of judicial readings,
and in the framework of other statutes and developing understandings of law.
If you are going to explore, as Judge Katzmann does not, the possibility that
courts act as the public's agent, not Congress's, then what the public could
and probably did understand when acting is as important to evoke as what
the legislators understood when voting. You might even find, as my students
have in connection with the Murphy statute, statutory considerations beyond
those mentioned in arguments or opinions, considerations that might have
41.

Raila v. United States, 355 E 3 d ni8 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Gayle, 342 E 3 d 89 (2d
Cir.2oo 3 ); Murphy v. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 402 E 3 d 332 (2d Cir.2oo4).
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Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481 (2006) (upholding Dolan); Small v. United States,
544 U.S. 385 (2005) (upholding Gayle).

43.

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).

44.

See text accompanying note 3, supra.

45.

135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
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influenced public expectations, or reflected coherent legislative understandings
of meaning.

VI
An underlying premise of this book is that judges do not understand or
trust legislative processes, and that if they are to accept their secondary role
in law generation to legislatures they need to learn to do so. Legislators and
their staffs, as Bressman and Gluck have so well shown, 46 need also better to
understand howjudges will approach their work. And so in his final substantive
chapter, "Promoting Understanding," Judge Katzmann addresses his view,
reinforced by his own experience on both sides, "that at some basic level, each
institution- that is, the courts and the legislature-could benefit from a deeper
appreciation of how the other operates" (92).
In imagining "periodic seminars about the legislative process for judges
and law clerks" (92), he does not dig deeply Perhaps Congress's institutional
commitments, on which he so relies in upholding the utility of legislative
history, are challenged by the current legislative practices and conditionsenormous statutes, disruptive partisanship inviting efforts at covert statutory
subversion such as may have underlain the dispute in Burwell. It is not hard
to imagine that these would impede those seminars, have them presenting an
idealized process quite different from the reality all (including the judges and
their clerks) could see. In a brief section entitled "Making Legislative History
More Reliable" (iO2), he acknowledges the omnibus bill problem, but it is not
clear that having "legislative leadership ... more clearly identify legislative
history that courts should take into account" (iO2) is a sufficient response.
He appears willing to privilege statements in debate and colloquies that floor
managers would signal as definitive; but floor managers are as capable and
motivated as any Member-indeed, perhaps more so-to attempt to secure
credibility for statements they fear could not survive an up or down vote. He
does not address Congress's recent disarray, heightening these problems.
At least as important, in my judgment, is that here, as in the preceding
pages, he suggests no difference between judges and Justices-between
decisions in the ordinary cases that lower court judges are obliged to decide
and the extraordinary ones Supreme Court Justices choose to decide. It is,
to be sure, even more regrettable when the judges of our highest court act
as if their lawmaking powers (which the exercise of interpretive authority
given stare decisis effect most certainly is) act in ways that effectively deny the
secondary nature of their lawmaking, by refusing to consult materials that
could illuminate the meaning attached to statutes by those who voted upon
them, while simultaneously insisting that dictionaries of the age of the enacting
Congress, not the likely or effective understanding of the contemporary public,
must control. But perhaps that problem at the Supreme Court level could be
more readily endured if in ordinary cases the judges and law clerks of lower
46.

Supra, note 2.
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courts-those who might be attending these seminars and disposed to learn
from them-would take a different approach.
In discussing possible congressional accommodations, "drafting and
statutory revision, "Judge Katzmann does address himself below the highest level
of actor concerned-perhaps, in consequence, to those most likely to change.
Respecting drafting, there is not too much to say-the utility of checklists,
guidebooks on drafting, enacting default rules. But he considers at some length
the ways in which courts contribute to statutory revision by "housekeeping"
measures developed through the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and the
U.S. Judicial Conference. These measures alert relevant congressional officials
and drafters to judicial decisions that address statutes that, for one reason or
another, could benefit from additional legislative attention. Only the opinions
are sent, not commentary, but in the view of their recipients, "'These modest
efforts have supplied pertinent and timely information to Congress that it
might not otherwise receive,' including information about 'possible technical
problems in statutes that may be susceptible to technical amendment; and,
in any case, how statutes might be drafted to reflect legislative intent more
accurately"' (ioi).

VII
The Justices of the Supreme Court choose their docket, and do so (one
would hope) in the most difficult and portentous of cases, those in which the
Nation most needs to have the law settled. For this reason, their almost wholly
voluntary docket is inevitably created in a highly politicized process. The
dockets of the courts of appeal are involuntary and (in general) peopled with
less momentous and less difficult cases. For just this reason, there could be
much to differentiate judging statutes at the Supreme Court's level from what
would best occur at the court of appeals level. It is perhaps a side benefit of
systems that have separate constitutional courts that the judges of their ordinary
courts are not within their hierarchical control. As noted, the arguable difference
between court of appeals' judging of statutes and the Supreme Court's is not a
subjectJudge Katzmann explores. While I wish he had addressed it, as I wish
he had given more weight to the arguments for a (public not judicial) reader's
perspective on statutory text,JudgingStatutes, in its text and in its thorough and
helpful appendices, is a remarkable brief introduction to the problems.

